Why Trump Should Reject FDD’s Hardline and Choose Peace with Iran?
Considered a neocortex think tank with headquarters in Washington, D.C., the Foundation for Defence of Democracy (FDD) has long been a strong supporter of forceful US policies directed against Iran. Often labelled as a pro-Israel lobbying group and known for its relentless opposition to the Iranian government, FDD has championed a “maximum pressure” strategy that leaves little opportunity for diplomacy or peaceful settlement. Leveraging its impact to steer presidents away from communication and toward confrontation, it has positioned itself over the years as a major participant in American foreign policy circles. This essay contends that now back in office former President Donald Trump should ignore FDD’s advise and concentrate on strengthening US-Iran relations. Through this, he could transform the Middle East and leave behind a legacy of enduring peace rather than constant conflict.
FDD has been quite helpful in promoting strong policies, especially against Iran, since its founding in 2001. Under Trump’s first term, the think tank was one of the main intellectual forces behind the US pullout from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), sometimes known as the Iran nuclear agreement. Targeting Barack Obama’s diplomatic legacy, this action signalled the start of the “maximum pressure” campaign, a tactic anchored in political isolation and economic penalties. Deep into the Trump administration, FDD’s impact was felt frequently in concert with hawkish leaders like Mike Pompeo and John Bolton.
Policy recommendations from FDD challenge outright regime change rather than focusing only on penalties. Their reports and media appearances often support the implementation of severe sanctions, military threats, and even practices that almost certainly constitute collective punishment of the Iranian population. Senior fellows like Saeed Ghasseminejad and Behnam Ben Taleblu among other FDD members seem to function as ideological crusaders with personal axes to grind, not as objective policy specialists. This reflects the position of Ahmad Chalabi before to the Iraq War, an architect of false information whose recommendations guided the US into one of its most expensive and disruptive military operations.
Additionally, closely associated with a network of pro-Israel funders like Paul Singer and Bernard Marcus is FDD. These ties affect the advocacy of the research group, especially its uncompromising stance that reflects that of right-wing leadership in Israel. Often published when diplomacy shows indications of improvement, the timing of FDD’s strategic documents points to an intention to undermine diplomatic projects. Published in 2023, one such paper clearly stated a plan based on pressure increase and regime change. It is not coincidental that these ideas find popularity exactly when talks look most promising.
The maximum pressure campaign has not met the declared objectives despite FDD’s assertions. Far from stopping Iran’s nuclear program, the JCPOA pullout and later sanctions simply gave Tehran more confidence. Iran started raising uranium enrichment levels outside JCPOA restrictions by 2019. Enrichment has peaked at 60% or over by 2025, dangerously pushing Iran to levels of weapons-grade quality. These events accompanied a breakdown in confidence between Washington and Tehran, therefore destroying the chances for fresh negotiations under the 2015 framework.
Beyond the nuclear problem, maximum pressure has caused great financial suffering for many Iranians while doing little to challenge the hold on power of the government. The International Monetary Fund reports that Iran’s GDP fell dramatically in 2020 and that its reserves of foreign currencies dropped as well. The subsequent suffering stoked public wrath, but not in the direction FDD anticipated. Sanctions enabled hardliners who claimed the West could never be trusted, not so much weakening the government. Direct results of this ill-informed approach include the election of President Ebrahim Raisi, and the growing anti-Western forces in the Iranian parliament.
Furthermore, raising the likelihood of military confrontation is maximum pressure. Widely believed to be influenced by FDD’s ideological network, Qassem Soleimani’s murder in 2020 put the US and Iran on close call for war. Far from reaching strategic goals, this approach has created a cycle of provocation and reprisal, increased the stakes and made diplomatic resolution more elusive.
By contrast, diplomacy provides real advantages. Notwithstanding its restrictions, the JCPOA established a verifiable inspection system and gave Iran more breakout time for nuclear bomb development. It proved that, albeit flawed, negotiated accords are significantly more successful than unilateral coercion in handling difficult security issues.
Enhanced US-Iran ties might release several strategic and regional advantages. First, from Syria and Iraq to Yemen and Lebanon, Iran is a prominent actor in practically every significant Middle Eastern war. Reducing tensions with Tehran might result in less backing for proxy organizations, hence opening the avenue for more thorough peace initiatives. Second, reintegration into the world economy may give American investors access to a big and maybe profitable market. Third, diplomacy could boost reformist and moderate aspects of Iran, hence raising the possibility of political liberalization down road.
Above all, seeking peace would let the US to turn its strategic emphasis toward new global issues, especially the rivalry with China and Russia, into another direction. Washington runs the danger of being marginalized by sticking to a combative posture as European, Chinese, and Russian diplomats strengthen their ties to Tehran.
Recent events in 2025 show the possibilities as well as the risks US-Iran relations run. Omani informal conversations in April were praised as positive as both sides looked at methods to restrict Iran’s nuclear programme in return for sanctions relief. Talks were suddenly cancelled in May, though, following provocative US actions included more oil restrictions and apparent backing for Iranian enemies in Yemen. These choices closely reflect FDD’s long-standing advice since they followed Trump’s restoration of the maximum pressure approach and a disguised threat of military force.
Although some may see this as evidence of strength, history reveals it is a risky venture. The mistakes of the past five years show that pressure by itself will not force Iran to submit. Rather, it separates moderates, fuels mistrust and raises the possibility of war.
Donald Trump has a special chance to deviate from the neocortex model that melded his Iran policy throughout his first term. The strict FDD posture stems from a limited ideological agenda that ignores Iran’s internal complexity or regional factors. Its prescriptions are harmful as well as useless. Trump runs the danger of repeating the same errors that resulted in higher tensions and reduced American credibility by keeping this advice.
Along with lessening the possibility of war, a diplomatic turn would help US leadership be reasserted worldwide. It would improve regional stability, promote economic activity, and boost voices inside Iran seeking peace rather than hostility.
Donald Trump should reject the advice of the Foundation for Defence of Democracies and adopt a fresh approach anchored in diplomacy and pragmatism. Already showing flaws, the maximum pressure campaign has caused regional unrest, nuclear escalation, and the entrenchment of hardline Iranian factions. On the other hand, participation and compromise present a respectable road toward peace and de-escalation. Along with current diplomatic structures such as the Abraham Accords, a fresh US-Iran conversation might change the area. Trump can be remembered for breaking from the past and boldly charting a new course that emphasizes American interests, world stability, and the continuing promise of peace rather than for dragging on old battles.
