China’s Psywar Against India in Arunachal Pradesh

The latest announcement of the 27 new places renamed by China in Arunachal Pradesh is the most dramatic development in the long-term policy of cartographic aggression and psywar that the PRC has been pulling on India with and the enormous failure of strategic planning and capacity in New Delhi is on full display. It is proving not a show of tokenism, but a conscious and careful bid by Beijing to stamp its ownership over Arunachal Pradesh what it claims to be the “South Tibet” both symbolically and practically in great unconcern to international law and the on-ground reality. Within an enlarged geopolitical setting, such a step can be viewed as an indication of the fact that level of mistrust between two Asian giants remains very low and China is gaining strategic confidence with which is also pursuing South Asia geopolitics. India is carrying on with yet another rhetoric of keeping its military profile strong along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), not to mention its much advertised stand taken at Galwan and militarization of the border areas, the failure to anticipate or act decisively in the face of such Chinese aggressions proves the emptiness of its diplomatic deterrence and apathy of its foreign policy.
New Delhi has become rather active in marketing the notion of a rising world power with an increasing sphere of influence, talking about so called strategic breakthroughs involving the United States, countries of the Middle East, or in regional multilateral forums. These high-profile foreign interactions, promoted through hashtags and photography spots, however, have done little to bear real fruits as Chinese influence remains uncontrolled in the immediate neighborhood of India. The recent incursion of Beijing in Arunachal Pradesh strips off the mirage of strategic stability in the Sino Indian border. It also presents the way China wields such nonmilitary instruments like maps, renaming, diplomatic statements in order to gradually destroy the territorial claims of India and never uttering a gun shot. Ownership of 176 prime seaports in 3 continents, control of major minerals in shortage and geopolitical investments in South Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative makes China both economically strong as well as geopolitically powerful.
Symbolic activities such as renaming Indian towns and regions in this climate are not arbitrary or of minor concern, but on the contrary, they are demonstrative acts of power and authority. Chinese long-term perception of regional domination, where charts and stories are as valuable as soldiers and agreements. In the case of India, it seems that the country is involved in a loop of firefighting instead of being engaging. Its foreign policy is becoming more like a reactionary one with the ministry of external affairs giving statements of the repetitive nature of non-recognition instead of telling a story that puts them back in control of the discussion at the regional and the international level.
The diplomatic discomfort of India is added the manageable but diplomatically lepers fact that China has always supported Pakistan, particularly at those times when its own tension with India is in the explosive stage. In its recent confrontation, the support of Islamabad by China, either in diplomatic circles at the UN, in terms of defense collaboration, or even by articulating strategic powers, showed to the world that India had again failed to adjust itself in diplomatic terms. It had long been in strategic circles that, in case of any escalation between India and Pakistan, China would fall on the side of Pakistan, not only to offset India, but because of its own interests in China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through the Pakistan administered Kashmir.
India has had to contend with the possibility of facing a two front fight but this will not be a purely military one but a very political and psychological one. On the one hand, it has to deal with a well-fortified LAC where Chinese are developing infrastructure faster than India can manage. On the one side there is its maneuvering in a diplomatic arena where China keeps gaining symbolic triumph, whether in the United Nations, in bilateral combinations or in the means of “aggressive cartography” such as the renaming of Arunachal towns. These gestures are symbolic in nature, they have their accrued effect by slowly forming international perception and posing questions to the validity of Indian claims, particularly to the nations of the so-called neutral group who are relatively unknown to the delicate nature of the territorial disagreement. This also turns out to be more so when New Delhi is pursuing to gain more international status such as permanent seat at the UN Security council and greater influence at multilateral organizations like G20 and BRICS.
The agenda of Beijing completely contradicts its rhetoric on non-expansionism and peaceful coexistence. Although China maintains it does not pursue any territorial expansion, its actions demonstrate the opposite, as it harasses the South China Sea, gradually acquires more territory along the LAC, takes such a step as renaming cities in Arunachal Pradesh, etc. These measures are included into an overall strategy of hybrid warfare in which what is used are the psychological pressure, economic leverage, and symbolic aggression in exhausting the adversary without any direct military conflict. In this regard, the claims by the Indian government in relying on the projection of military forces as an only array of defense citing Galwan and military patrols cannot suffice.
But India appears rather unwilling, or incapable, of thinking multidimensionally in strategy. The fact that it has failed to internationalize the provocative Chinese behavior as it did with its more successful attempts to focus the Pakistani behavior, hints at a conservative and in many instances an ostrich like approach to China policy. Such reluctance would be due to economic ties, economic interests, or risk-averse fears of becoming involved but, whatever the cause, the outcome is identical the emboldened Beijing, with no actual price to pay regarding sabotaging Indian sovereignty or positions of power. India fails in creating a cohesive narrative that depicts the renaming gimmick of China as a hybrid aggression and a threat to peace in the region and India consequently deprives itself the driving force in international institutions. Rather, it will enable China to determine the terms of engagement not only in terms of territory, but in terms of legitimacy.
This incident has shocked even around the homeland; opposition leaders and strategic observers have started to doubt the effectiveness of high decibel foreign policy of New Delhi which appears more interested in appearance than acts. When fundamental territorial problems have not and even are not discussed at the diplomatic level the rhetoric of the so-called Vishwa Guru (world teacher) ever more sounds empty. The citizens want to know what the government intends to do concerning the protection of the Indian interest as its immediate neighbors staunchly seem to be working against it both diplomatically and strategically, China on the Northern side and Pakistan on the Western side. In the meantime, the average Indian is left with pictures of national maps being doctored in Chinese state-owned media, seeing their towns being renamed by an outside force, and learning very little except platitude and claims of non-recognition by their government.
To summarize all the above, naming 89 places in Arunachal Pradesh is much more than ceremonial, it is a maneuver of sovereignty, a psychological warfare and a wakeup call to India foreign policy establishment. It reveals the fact that New Delhi is weak to the cartographic aggression, it can never prevent the Chinese strategic play, and the disparity between the international goals and regional realities of India is increasing. India poses all along military, maintaining a tough guy image on the world stage, publicity, and relentless assertion, but Beijing is rearranging the strategic board smeared by narratives, coalitions, and by assertion. Without careful re-calculation of the India-China policy in terms of offensive diplomacy, powerful counter narratives, and enhanced regional coalitions, India may lose not only the region but also prestige as a country in the world map. May be, Arunachal Pradesh is under the Indian rule in the physical sense, the psychological and diplomatic fight over whether it is partly Chinese is not over yet and in the present case it is the battle that India is losing.