Pakistan US Counterterrorism Alliance
Pakistan US Counterterrorism Alliance
From Tactical Convergence to Strategic Partnership
The Counterterrorism Dialogue in Islamabad held on August 12, 2025, was a turning point in Pakistan US relations that changed the relationship. Primarily from transactional cooperation into the formative phase of being a strategically aligned relationship. Defined shortly after Washington declared the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its Majeed Brigade as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, the meeting harmonized the threat perceptions between the two countries and provided actionable plans of cooperation in operations.
The fact that a joint statement refers to the BLA is a diplomatic breakthrough for Pakistan. It confirms Islamabad’s stand that separatist violence in Balochistan is not an internal domestic problem but connected with outside support networks. In the case of the US, it indicates a more pragmatic adjustment moving beyond a narrower focus on Afghanistan and considering not only the interrelated character of militant, separatist, and transnational threats but also that South Asia needs to be considered a significant front in the counterterrorism effort.
The dialogue, which was co chaired by Ambassador Nabeel Munir and Gregory LoGerfo, came up with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), BLA, and Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) as common priorities of concern. This shared picture of the threat allows combined intelligence sharing, correlated interdictions, and money network destruction. Rather than engaging in reactive capacity, such accuracy is a result of anchoring in agreed operational processes that enable a strategic planning process to guide the long term.
It is significant timing. Cooperation had been limited by the years of mistrust encouraged by differences over sovereignty and over differing regional strategies, as well as a shifting set of US priorities.
“With Michael Kugelman labeling the talks as landmark, there is a consensus on the need for reliable security alignment.”
It is strengthened by the aforementioned intense high level contacts, such as two trips of Field Marshal Asim Munir to Washington and interactions of the Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar with the Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
More importantly, the talk was not about conventional counterterrorism anymore. Both parties discussed how the emerging technologies, encrypted platforms, and cryptocurrencies are being abused by terror networks.
This prospective strategy acknowledges that the future battle will not be fought on the battlefield, but in the digital, financial, and information domains
Having to avert exploitation in these spheres entails having to be innovative rather than forceful.
An additional strategic value is present in the multilateral dimension. They can also use such a forum as the United Nations to portray themselves as a contributor to the international norms on counter terrorism. Whereas, the US can have a competent player that enjoys strategic leverage in such a region, where there is increasing geopolitical rivalry.
The alliance is extending to the economic and technological arena, too. For example, advances in tariff talks and US interest in investing in Pakistan with a mineral and energy sector is a factor. Likewise, discussions of how to take a strategic step towards digital assets are examples of how security cooperation is to be based, in part, on total economic interdependence. The point of this diversification is relevant because the alliances built exclusively based on countering terrorism tend to come under pressure when the threat is no longer obvious. Economic cooperation brings a stake in stability longer than can be blurred by any short-term security crisis.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, the timing is also opportune. It is playing against the backdrop of militancy that has proved tough to eliminate, amidst its regional rivalries and the economic burden. Therefore, it has been lucky to be in partnership with an entity that has acknowledged its security purpose as well as its economic potential. In the case of the US, Pakistan is a well placed and experienced counterterrorism partner, both strategically relevant to the South Asian security but also to the global supply chain involving energy and minerals.
The cynicism is understandable, as the history of Pakistan US alignments bears out as having evaporated after the priorities of the parties involved were changed. To evade such a trend, it will be necessary to institutionalize cooperation, keep the transparency, and abide by the strategic red lines. What is unique about this instant is that there has been a convergence to name what are called threat actors, such as the BLA and IS-K, accompanied by parallel gains in economic and technological cooperation.
As an accomplishment, the August dialogue is to be regarded as a beginning rather than as a conclusion. Its ability to be successful is based on the need to keep the momentum high to protect the collaboration against political volatility and the understanding that counter terrorism, as it exists today, is intertwined with economic security, cyber resilience, and skillful diplomacy. When handled with care, it will become the onset of a long term narrative, a shift that will see Pakistan and the US transition. It will not only from transactional security relations but rather into one where the relationship is multifaceted and able to drive the regional order.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in this article are exclusively those of the author and do not reflect the official stance, policies, or perspectives of the Platform.
