More Troops to Battle Al-Shabaab

Turkey’s military involvement in Somalia has escalated by sending more troops and military equipment, therefore signifying a major increase in its participation in the long-standing conflict of East Africa against the extremist group Al-Shabaab. This action shows Turkey’s increasing influence in the dynamics of regional security as well as its more general strategic aspirations on the African continent.
Confirmed by Turkish and Somali officials, the latest deployment coincides with a period when the Somali government is intensifying its attack against Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated insurgent organization that has tormented Somalia and its neighbours for more than ten years. Sources inside the Somali Ministry of Defence state that the Turkish military will help with training, logistical, intelligence-sharing, and operational support. These reinforcements are supposed to increase the capacity of the Somali National Army (SNA), which keeps fighting even with years of foreign aid.
Turkey has long-standing military presence in Somalia. Ankara opened its biggest foreign military camp in Mogadishu in 2017, and since then thousands of Somali troops have been trained there. Called “TURKSOM,” the institution has been instrumental in improving Somalia’s security system. But the most recent deployment shows a shift from mostly training duties to more direct participation in real counter-terrorism operations.
This change in Turkey’s approach coincides with the Somali government under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud stepping up its effort to eradicate Al-Shabaab from its surviving strongholds. Recent offensives in southern and central Somalia have had conflicting results. Targeting both military and civilian populations, the group keeps launching lethal attacks including suicide bombers, ambushes, and assassinations even although several towns have been freed.
Supporting Somalia extends beyond counterterrorism for Turkey. It expresses a mix of strategic interest, religious unity, and humanitarian concern. Turkey has become a major friend and donor since 2011, when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited famine-torn Somalia, investing in commerce, infrastructure, health care, and education. The first big foreign carrier to start flying to Mogadishu was Turkish Airlines, and Turkish building companies have helped to reconstruct hospitals, roads, and schools.
Turkey distinguishes itself from other foreign countries with interests in the area by this multifarious involvement, which has won it great respect among common Somalis. But it has also begged problems about Ankara’s long-term goals among rivals and observers. Some see Turkey’s increased military engagement as part of its larger goal to establish itself as a significant actor in the Horn of Africa, an area of increasing geopolitical relevance because of its closeness to the Red Sea and main maritime routes.
Turkey’s action also fits changing international support for Somalia’s security. In keeping with an UN-mandated strategy to hand security duties to Somali forces, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which replaced the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), is progressively pulling down its soldiers. This change has caused questions about a possible security void that would empower Al-Shabaab. Some view Turkey’s increased engagement as a timely counterpoint to this possible disparity.
From Somali standpoint, the Turkish presence is both expected and required. Particularly in front of growing Al-Shabaab threats and a comeback of Islamic State-affiliated terrorists in some areas of the nation, the Somali government has repeatedly demanded consistent foreign backing. With tight relationships to Somali colleagues and increasing experience in asymmetric warfare, Turkish forces could provide a crucial edge in next operations.
Still, obstacles still exist. The political scene of Somalia is disjointed, with continuous conflict between the central authority and various regional states. Any military effort cannot succeed without consistent command and coordination. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab’s resiliency stems from its capacity to take advantage of political weaknesses, economic complaints, and clan rivalries as well as from military strength. Unless it is accompanied by initiatives in reconciliation, development, and inclusive governance, a strictly military approach, even with more foreign help, is unlikely to produce enduring peace.
Critics also warn that the militarizing of foreign aid runs the danger of making Somalia a battlefield for international rivalries. Coordinating among several players, including the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and now especially Turkey, involved in Somali security and politics helps to prevent duplication, mistrust, or unintentionally supporting forces that compromise national unity.
Still, Turkey’s growing involvement in Somalia is a notable illustration of a middle power using soft and hard power in concert. Its contributions in military cooperation, infrastructural development, and humanitarian aid have established it as a reliable friend for Somalia at a turning point.
All eyes will be on the success of Turkish forces in turning the tide against Al-Shabaab as they start their intensified operation in Somalia. Their either success or failure could affect Turkey’s reputation as a stabilizing agent in a difficult area as well as Somalia’s delicate security.
Ultimately, Turkey’s choice to send more troops to Somalia shows both a more general geopolitical calculation and a response to a pressing security requirement. For Somalia, it offers a possible lifeline in a war that has sapped funds and claimed countless lives. For Turkey, it is a test of its rising global actor ability to influence events much beyond its boundaries. The next months will show if this audacious action tips the scales in one of the most ingrained wars in Africa.