The Systemic Weaknesses Undermining India’s Nuclear Credibility
India’s expanding nuclear profile is often framed as a marker of its rise as a major power, an emblem of technological sophistication and strategic maturity. Yet this ascent carries a parallel responsibility: demonstrating consistently high standards of nuclear safety, security, and accountability. Over the last two decades, however, India’s publicly documented mishandling of radioactive sources, recurring seizures of uranium, and the accidental launch of a nuclear-capable missile have raised substantive questions about the coherence and effectiveness of its nuclear governance. These concerns are neither manufactured nor rooted in geopolitical rivalry; they arise from evidence within India itself, pointing to structural vulnerabilities that demand more than assurances. In an era where nuclear risks are increasingly tied not only to state adversaries but also to accidents, illicit networks, and institutional lapses, India’s record warrants deeper examination.
A critical component of any nuclear system is the management of radioactive materials across their entire lifecycle, from production to deployment to disposal. India’s track record on this front has been inconsistent at best. The Mayapuri incident of 2010 remains emblematic of systemic failure: a decommissioned Cobalt-60 irradiator left an academic institution without proper tracking, warnings, or disposal procedures. Its entry into a scrap market ultimately resulted in severe radiation exposure to unsuspecting workers, with fatal consequences for at least one individual.
The International Atomic Energy Agency cited the episode as a major lapse in radioactive source management, highlighting deficiencies in oversight and institutional responsibility. It should have triggered sweeping reforms, yet events in subsequent years demonstrate that vulnerabilities persist
Consider the 2019 disappearance of a Cesium-137 source used by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, later found at a scrap dealership following police intervention. This was not the result of routine checks or automated detection mechanisms but a recovery driven by ad hoc investigation. When radioactive sources repeatedly exit authorized custody without immediate detection, the issue transcends procedural oversight; it reflects a deeper cultural problem in which safety protocols are treated as afterthoughts rather than inviolable requirements. In nuclear governance, culture is as important as technology. A system that allows such lapses, whether due to overstretched regulators, institutional complacency, or fragmented oversight, signals the need for systemic recalibration.
More troubling still is the pattern of uranium seizures across multiple Indian states. In 2016, nearly nine kilograms of depleted uranium were confiscated near Mumbai in an attempted illegal sale. This volume cannot be dismissed as a trivial residue or industrial scrap. In 2021, successive seizures in Maharashtra and Jharkhand yielded more than 13 kilograms of natural uranium combined, again in the hands of private actors with no lawful access. Indian authorities insisted that the material was not enriched and therefore not immediately usable for weapons. That argument misses the point. Unauthorized possession of any uranium, depleted, natural, or enriched, reveals gaps in supply-chain security, raises questions about internal leakages, and creates opportunities for malicious exploitation.
Nuclear security experts have long warned that trafficking networks thrive in environments where oversight is uneven and deterrence is weak. India’s recurring uranium cases fit uncomfortably into that pattern
These internal challenges intersect with a more acute strategic concern: the accidental launch of a BrahMos missile in March 2022. Indian authorities later described the firing as an error during routine maintenance, but the implications were far from routine. The BrahMos, jointly developed with Russia, is a sophisticated supersonic cruise missile compatible with both conventional and potential nuclear payloads. Its accidental crossing into another sovereign state’s territory without immediate clarification risked misinterpretation, escalation, and strategic instability. India did issue a statement after internal investigation, but delayed transparency and limited detail left lingering questions about procedural rigor and fail-safe mechanisms. Nuclear command-and-control systems are designed with multiple layers of redundancy precisely to prevent such incidents; their failure suggests that India’s safety architecture requires deeper stress-testing.
Compounding these concerns is a degree of doctrinal drift. India’s long-standing No First Use policy contributed to regional stability by providing predictability in crisis situations. Yet periodic statements by senior officials have cast uncertainty on the doctrine’s permanence or conditionality. At the same time, India is investing heavily in more flexible delivery systems and precision-strike capabilities that blur distinctions between conventional and nuclear operations. Such developments increase the burden on command-and-control systems and raise the stakes for any procedural lapses.
When dual-use platforms proliferate within an environment that has already experienced an accidental launch, the risk calculus becomes more complex and potentially destabilizing
India’s regulatory architecture, on paper, appears robust. It includes dedicated safety agencies, codified procedures, and mandatory reporting standards. The recurrent failures, however, reveal uneven enforcement and fragmentation across jurisdictions. Radioactive sources frequently appear in scrap yards rather than designated disposal facilities. Uranium surfaces in criminal markets rather than being tightly monitored from extraction to storage. Strategic systems undergo “routine maintenance” that somehow results in a missile launch. These are not gaps that can be bridged by rhetoric or policy documents alone; they require empowered regulators, real-time tracking systems, stringent accountability mechanisms, and a transparent safety culture.
For India to fully assume its role as a responsible nuclear power, it must address these weaknesses with seriousness and urgency. This includes comprehensive reform of materials management, investment in tracking and detection technologies, and modernization of strategic command-and-control protocols. It also requires abandoning the instinct to treat safety incidents as reputational liabilities to be minimized. Instead, they must be recognized as systemic signals demanding corrective action. The credibility of a nuclear state rests not on declarations of responsibility but on demonstrated behavior. Until India confronts and rectifies the persistent flaws revealed by its own incidents, concerns about its nuclear safety will remain grounded not in rhetoric, but in reality.
