When Politics Overrides Peace in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Pakistan’s latest attempt at political dialogue has once again ended where too many such exercises have ended before, in mistrust, competing demands and a widening gap between words and actions. The government and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf entered negotiations at a moment when the country badly needed political temperature to come down. Instead, the talks exposed a deeper problem. Pakistan is facing both political instability and a serious security challenge, yet the major political actors remain unable to agree on even the minimum conditions required to deal with either.
The most troubling disagreement concerns Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Government representatives have linked progress in negotiations to stronger cooperation from the provincial administration in counterterrorism efforts. Reports from the talks indicate that Islamabad expressed dissatisfaction with what it considered inadequate provincial support for security forces and law enforcement agencies operating against terrorism. The federal side has also argued that the provincial government must fulfil its constitutional responsibilities in terrorism affected areas. PTI, meanwhile, has disputed the government’s position and the negotiations have remained deadlocked over these security related questions.
This is not a minor political disagreement that can be postponed until another committee meeting. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has repeatedly suffered from terrorism. Its policemen, soldiers, tribal communities, political workers and ordinary citizens have paid a heavy price. At a time when militant violence remains a national security concern, counterterrorism cannot become hostage to party rivalry between Islamabad and Peshawar. The obvious question, therefore, is why effective cooperation should be difficult at all.
A provincial government is not expected to surrender its political identity merely because the federal government asks for coordination. It has every right to disagree over policy, operational methods and the distribution of resources. But there must be a distinction between political disagreement and institutional paralysis. When terrorism is involved, the federation, province, police, intelligence institutions and civil administration cannot afford to function as rival camps.
President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif themselves recently stressed the need for cooperation among state institutions while discussing the security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. That emphasis is important because peace in KP cannot be treated as the responsibility of one institution alone. PTI also faces another uncomfortable contradiction.
It entered talks with the government while simultaneously preparing for a march on Islamabad. The planned protest had already caused extensive disruption before it even began. Containers were deployed around the capital and transport networks were affected as authorities prepared to block protesters. Reuters reported serious disruption to freight movement and commercial activity as containers were requisitioned for road blockades.
Political parties unquestionably have a democratic right to protest peacefully. But negotiations and confrontation cannot indefinitely operate on parallel tracks. If a negotiating delegation cannot commit its party to suspending a march while talks continue, then its practical authority becomes open to question. What exactly is being negotiated if the negotiators cannot deliver on the most immediate issue under negotiation?
This is where PTI must clarify its political strategy. Is dialogue meant to find a settlement, or is it merely another instrument in a broader pressure campaign? The party cannot demand meaningful engagement from the government while leaving open the possibility that street pressure will continue regardless of what happens across the negotiating table.
The government must be held to the same standard. Dialogue cannot become an excuse for squeezing political opponents, restricting legitimate dissent or treating every protester as a security threat. Negotiation succeeds only when both parties believe the process offers something more credible than confrontation. But PTI carries an additional responsibility because it governs the province currently at the centre of Pakistan’s most difficult counterterrorism debate.
Politics built overwhelmingly around the fate of one leader eventually creates institutional weakness. Every policy question begins to be measured by whether it helps or harms that leader. Provincial governance, economic development, security policy and parliamentary engagement then risk becoming subordinate to a single political struggle. That is dangerous for any party. It is especially dangerous in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
PTI has governed the province for much of the past decade. Its responsibility is therefore greater than simply blaming Islamabad for security failures. It must demonstrate that strengthening the police, improving civilian administration, coordinating counterterrorism measures and protecting vulnerable districts remain governmental priorities independent of its confrontation with the Centre.
Pakistan has already spent too many years moving from agitation to crackdown, from negotiations to boycott, and from political accusations to administrative paralysis. Ordinary citizens bear the cost. Businesses lose working days, roads close, public services suffer and investment decisions are delayed. More seriously, political conflict consumes the attention that should be directed toward terrorism, economic recovery and governance.PTI should not abandon opposition politics. Nor should the government expect political surrender in the name of stability. What Pakistan needs is responsible opposition and responsible government.
That requires PTI to decide whether it wants negotiations to produce an agreement or merely political optics. It also requires the KP government to place counterterrorism cooperation above partisan confrontation wherever genuine security requirements are involved.
The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa deserve more than political symbolism. They deserve security, functioning institutions and a government focused on their daily lives. And Pakistan deserves political parties capable of recognising that no personality, no march and no party interest can be more important than the stability of the state itself.
