Can Pakistan’s Existing Provincial Map Deliver 21st-Century Governance?
Pakistan has changed beyond recognition since its present provincial structure took shape, but its administrative map has barely moved. That mismatch is becoming harder to ignore. The country that had roughly 65 million people in the early 1970s now has more than 241 million. According to the 2023 census, Punjab alone contains about 127.7 million people, Sindh 55.7 million, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 40.9 million and Balochistan 14.9 million. Punjab today has almost twice as many people as the whole country had half a century ago.
Yet Pakistan continues to expect four provincial governments to carry much of the burden of education, healthcare, policing, infrastructure, economic planning and social development. The issue, therefore, is not simply that Pakistan has become more populous. It is whether institutions designed for a dramatically smaller population can remain responsive when the scale of administration has multiplied several times over.
This question becomes especially visible in Punjab. Governing Lahore, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Multan, Bahawalpur and Dera Ghazi Khan through one provincial political and administrative centre means managing regions with very different economic structures and development requirements. Southern Punjab has long complained of weaker access to quality healthcare, educational opportunities, infrastructure and public investment than the better developed parts of central and northern Punjab. Whatever one’s political position on a separate South Punjab province, the underlying governance problem deserves serious attention.
Administrative size does not automatically produce poor government, just as creating new provinces would not automatically produce good government. But beyond a certain point, scale can become an obstacle. When decision-making is concentrated hundreds of kilometres away, peripheral districts struggle to compete with established political and economic centres. Files move slowly, development priorities become filtered through provincial capitals and citizens often encounter government as a distant institution rather than an accessible one.
The problem will grow rather than disappear. Pakistan’s population will continue increasing for decades. A country moving towards several hundred million people cannot reasonably postpone discussion about the structure through which those people will be governed. More children will require schools. Expanding cities will need transport, housing, water and sanitation. Hospitals, courts, police forces and municipal administrations will face heavier demand. The question is not whether these pressures will arrive. Many are already here.
Pakistan is also unusual when compared with other large federations and populous countries. India has 28 states and eight Union Territories. Nigeria has 36 states. The United States has 50 states, while Indonesia has 38 provinces. These countries are hardly identical, and Pakistan should not mechanically copy any of them. But their experience demonstrates an important principle: changing internal administrative boundaries is not inherently incompatible with national unity. Administrative reorganisation can, when carefully designed, strengthen the state by bringing institutions closer to citizens.
Pakistan should therefore stop treating discussion of additional provinces as though it automatically threatens the federation. A province is an administrative and constitutional instrument, not a sacred geographical object. If an administrative boundary ceases to serve citizens efficiently, examining alternatives is legitimate.
Existing divisions could provide one practical starting point. They already have headquarters, district networks and bureaucratic infrastructure. Building reforms around established administrative geography would be less disruptive than drawing entirely new boundaries from scratch. But converting every division into a province would be equally simplistic. Population, fiscal viability, geography, infrastructure, local preferences and economic capacity would all have to be examined before any reorganisation.
There are also genuine costs. New provinces would require assemblies, secretariats, administrative departments, judicial arrangements and changes in resource distribution. Existing political elites may resist losing influence. Debates over language and ethnicity could turn administrative reform into identity confrontation. Poorly designed provinces could simply reproduce the same centralisation at a smaller scale, replacing one distant elite with another.
That is why local government must remain part of the discussion. Article 140A of the Constitution already requires provinces to establish elected local governments and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility to them. Pakistan does not have to wait for new provincial boundaries to empower districts, tehsils and municipal governments. Regular local elections, predictable financial transfers and genuine control over everyday services could produce immediate improvements.
Ultimately, the choice should not be framed as new provinces versus local governments. Pakistan may need both. Stronger local councils can handle neighbourhood and municipal services, while additional provinces could make regional planning and provincial-level administration more manageable.
Any alteration of provincial boundaries would rightly require broad political agreement. Article 239 sets a demanding constitutional threshold. A constitutional amendment requires two-thirds support in both Houses of Parliament, while a measure altering a province’s limits must also secure two-thirds of the total membership of the affected Provincial Assembly. Such safeguards ensure that administrative reform cannot simply be imposed from Islamabad.
The real test, however, should remain practical. Will a proposed change shorten the distance between citizens and government? Will it improve schools, hospitals, policing and infrastructure? Will public money be allocated more fairly? Will elected officials become easier to hold accountable?
Pakistan’s provincial map was built for another demographic age. Preserving it indefinitely merely because change is politically difficult would confuse continuity with stability. Strong states are not those whose institutions never change. They are those capable of changing before outdated institutions become obstacles to good governance. The debate Pakistan needs is therefore not about dividing the country. It is about bringing the state closer to its people.
