India’s Boycott Cannot Override International Water Law
India’s withdrawal from the Neutral Expert proceedings under the Indus Waters Treaty may be politically dramatic, but it is not legally decisive. The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s update of 31 July 2026 confirms that the proceedings concerning the Ratle and Kishenganga hydroelectric projects remain active, technical work continues, and a final determination is expected around 16 July 2027. India has changed its own participation; it has not extinguished the authority of the treaty mechanism.
This distinction matters because New Delhi increasingly appears to treat participation in international legal processes as optional whenever their political direction becomes inconvenient. India publicly maintains that the Indus Waters Treaty is being held “in abeyance” and has linked its restoration to allegations concerning cross-border terrorism. That is India’s declared political position, but a political declaration does not automatically rewrite treaty provisions or dissolve procedures constituted under them.
The Treaty was designed precisely to ensure that water disputes would not become hostage to every deterioration in bilateral relations
The Neutral Expert mechanism is not an informal dialogue dependent solely on diplomatic goodwill. It is a treaty-based procedure established under Article IX and Annexure F. In October 2022, the World Bank appointed Michel Lino as Neutral Expert to examine technical differences relating to the design of Kishenganga and Ratle. The Bank also stated that he would perform his duties independently and within the mandate granted by the Treaty. Once such a mechanism has been activated and has affirmed its competence, one party cannot acquire a procedural veto merely by refusing to attend.
That is why the Neutral Expert’s rejection of India’s request to suspend the process is significant. The proceedings have not been frozen. The revised Work Program remains operational, written stages continue, and independent specialists have begun numerical modelling connected with the disputed projects. Pakistan has attended meetings, submitted technical material and responded to questions, while India has repeatedly declined opportunities to participate or comment. The contrast is increasingly clear: Pakistan is testing its claims through evidence and established procedure, while India is contesting the process from outside it.
India’s absence also cannot prevent scrutiny of the engineering issues at the centre of the dispute. These proceedings are not being decided through slogans, press conferences or nationalist rhetoric. They concern pondage, reservoir behaviour, sediment management, outlet design, hydrological conditions and flow patterns. Numerical modelling enables specialists to assess how the projects may operate under different assumptions and whether their design features conform to treaty limitations.
Refusing to participate does not make those questions disappear; it only deprives India of further opportunities to shape the evidentiary record
The wider legal principle is equally important. In its June 2025 Supplemental Award on competence, the Court of Arbitration concluded that neither the Treaty nor customary international law permits one party, acting alone, to suspend an ongoing dispute-settlement proceeding. It also observed that Annexure F contains no provision allowing unilateral discontinuance of proceedings before a Neutral Expert. Although the Court of Arbitration and Neutral Expert are distinct mechanisms, the underlying institutional principle is the same: compulsory treaty procedures cannot function if either state can terminate them whenever it dislikes their continuation.
India’s withdrawal has therefore changed the optics, not the law. It may allow New Delhi to tell its domestic audience that it rejects external scrutiny, but it cannot require the Neutral Expert to abandon his mandate. Nor can it erase written submissions, technical data, modelling exercises or procedural decisions already produced. A state may leave the room, but it cannot take the legal process with it.
The roadmap leading towards a decision in July 2027 further demonstrates institutional continuity. A process with scheduled submissions, technical examinations, meetings and a final determination is not dormant. It retains momentum and a defined legal destination.
India’s continued absence increasingly looks less like an obstacle and more like a deliberate political choice not to use the opportunities still available
For Pakistan, the strongest course remains continued participation, disciplined technical preparation and reliance on treaty procedures. Islamabad should avoid reducing the dispute to reciprocal rhetoric. Its advantage lies in demonstrating that it is prepared to submit its case to independent examination and accept the discipline of a rules-based framework.
This dispute is larger than two hydroelectric projects. It tests whether international agreements retain meaning when political relations deteriorate. If states could suspend treaty mechanisms whenever compliance became inconvenient, dispute-resolution clauses would become empty promises. The Indus Waters Treaty was created to prevent precisely that outcome. India may boycott the proceedings, challenge their legitimacy and refuse to comment, but it cannot convert non-participation into legal authority. Withdrawal is a political act; termination requires a lawful basis. The Neutral Expert process continues because treaties are governed by agreed rules, not by the convenience of the party that walks away.
